Quine's two dogmas as a criticism of logical empiricism

Abstract

"Two Dogmas" was to demonstrate that logical positivism was possible solely due to unjustified assumptions. Quine aimed to point out that the rescuing of empiricism was possible only if another, holistic approach was accepted. However, Quine's article was anachronistic already at the time of its publication. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it will sketch Quine's argument and contrast it with the views held by Carnap and Dubislav. It will be claimed that Quine's criticism was late by more than fifteen years. Secondly, it is to examine Quine's postulate of empiricism without the dogmas and compare it briefly with a theory of Poznaski and Wundheiler. It will be claimed that Quine postulate was realized already in the 1930s.