El sentido de la fenomenología

Abstract

The present paper takes as its starting\rpoint the commentary of a text included in\rParagraph 5 of the General Appendix to the\rLogical Investigations (Logische\rUntersuchungen). Hinging on that text we bring\rthe husserlian concept of phenomenon (never\rreally grasped in all its depth by Heidegger) to\rthe fore, and some apories regarding eidetic\rvariation are posed as they are to be found in\rErfahrung und Urteil, as well as others pertaining\rto the problem of inner perception which, in\rnon-standard phenomenology, as it results\rfrom such apories, is to be construed as a contact\rof the self with itself, already implied in the\ridea of Nachschwimmen which the referred\rappendix by Husserl puts forward.\rWe then turn our attention to a preview\rof what we take to be (according to a\rproposal by J.T. Desanti) �non standard phenomenology�,\rthereby sketching some of its\rfundamental concepts and the way in which\rthey are intertwined and interspersed with the\rspirit (but not with the words per se) of Husserl�s\rphenomenology, the former being but a\rmodulation of genealogical phenomenology,\rthat is, a version which takes the structure of\rthe correlation ego-cogito-cogitatum or, for that\rmatter, that of noesis-hylè-nóema to rely on\rdeeper structures (not of an eidetic nature, but\rrather on schematic ones).\rWe are then dealing, basically, with the realm\rof affectiveness (neither intentional nor taken\ras self-affection), a domain which corresponds\rto the non-figurative (nor figurable) dimension\rof experience, dimension whose\rphenomenalization opens up what we call �hyperbolic\rphenomenological epoje�, in which\rphantasia, affectivity and schematism play a\rfundamental role