Encouraging Users to Change Breached Passwords Using the Protection Motivation Theory

Abstract

We draw on the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) to design interventions that encourage users to change breached passwords. Our online experiment () compared the effectiveness of a threat appeal (highlighting the negative consequences after passwords were breached) and a coping appeal (providing instructions on changing the breached password) in a 2 2 factorial design. Compared to the control condition, participants receiving the threat appeal were more likely to intend to change their passwords, and participants receiving both appeals were more likely to end up changing their passwords. Participants' password change behaviors are further associated with other factors, such as their security attitudes (SA-6) and time passed since the breach, suggesting that PMT-based interventions are useful but insufficient to fully motivate users to change their passwords. Our study contributes to PMT's application in security research and provides concrete design implications for improving compromised credential notifications.