Abstract
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation. © 2008 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Di Pierro, A., Hankin, C., & Wiklicky, H. (2008). Quantifying timing leaks and cost optimisation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5308 LNCS, pp. 81–96). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_6
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