Input controls vs. rights-based management: the political economy of fisheries management in Atlantic Canada

Abstract

This paper examines the Canadian experience with quota managed fisheries,reviewing institutional structures and approaches. It begins witha review of management objectives following the extension of jurisdictionand traces the nature and rationale of changes. The specific measuresused to achieve objectives are examined from a theoretical and practicalperspective. The measures fall into two broad categories: conventionalinput controls: vessel and gear restrictions; and, output controls:tradable and non-tradable enterprise/individual quotas. The experienceindicates that input controls are largely ineffective in constrainingeffort. These measures fail to address the common property characteristicsof the resource and consequently failed to blunt the incentives forshare maximization and increased capitalization. These in turn leadto overfishing and misreporting, thereby undermining management objectives.Output controls in the form of individual tradable quotas fare betterin constraining effort. They lead to fleet rationalization and improvedquality and flow of raw material to processing facilities. But theymay also lead to highgrading and discarding, as quantity incentivesgive way to unit-value incentives under the rights-based regime.Some of the early failures and more recent successes of policy areoutlined, lessons are drawn and suggestions made about future directions.