Abstract
Multiple realisation prompts the question: how is it that multiple systems all exhibit the same phenomena despite their different underlying properties? In this paper I develop a framework for addressing that question and argue that multiple realisation can be reductively explained. I illustrate this position by applying the framework to a simple example - the multiple realisation of electrical conductivity. I defend my account by addressing potential objections: contra (e.g.) Polger and Shapiro (2016), Batterman (2018), and Sober (1999), I claim that multiple realisation is commonplace, that it can be reductively explained, but that it requires a sui generis reductive explanatory strategy.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Franklin, A. (2021). Can Multiple Realisation be Explained? Philosophy, 96(1), 27–48. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819120000285
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