The Similarity-Updating Model of Probability Judgment and Belief Revision

Abstract

People often take nondiagnostic information into account when revising their beliefs.A probability judgment decreases due to nondiagnostic information represents the well-established “dilution effect” observed in many domains. Surprisingly, the opposite of the dilution effect called the “confirmation effect” has also been observed frequently. The present work provides a unified cognitive model that allows both effects to be explained simultaneously. The suggested similarity-updating model incorporates two psychological components: first, a similarity-based judgment inspired by categorization research, and second, a weighting-andadding process with an adjustment following a similarity-based confirmation mechanism. Four experimental studies demonstrate the model’s predictive accuracy for probability judgments and belief revision. The participants received a sample of information from one of two options and had to judge from which option the information came. The similarity-updating model predicts that the probability judgment is a function of the similarity of the sample to the options. When one is presented with a new sample, the previous probability judgment is updated with a second probability judgment by taking a weighted average of the two and adjusting the result according to a similarity-based confirmation. The model describes people’s probability judgments well and outcompetes a Bayesian cognitive model and an alternative probability-theory-plus-noise model. The similarity-updating model accounts for several qualitative findings, namely, dilution effects, confirmation effects, order effects, and the finding that probability judgments are invariant to sample size. In sum, the similarity-updating model provides a plausible account of human probability judgment and belief revision.