On Decision Variability in Child Protection: Respect, Interactive Universalism and Ethics of Care

Abstract

This article conceptualises theories of ethics relevant to the recognised problem of decision variability in child protection. Within this field, social workers are faced with multiple ethical imperatives when making decisions about children’s care. They must respond to justice principles concerned with duties and consequences, as well as ethical obligations created by the relational and contextual elements of each case. Recent scholarship on decision variability highlights the justice issues that arise when decisions in response to apparently similar cases differ. An ethical imperative is that similar cases should be treated ‘like for like’ so that children’s and family’s rights are upheld consistently. This article contends that ethical concepts relating to both universalist duties such as respect for persons, extended by the concept of interactive universalism, and contextual responses based on an ethic of care, help theorise the complexities of ethical decisions in child protection. These concepts develop a nuanced understanding of the ways social workers resist risk discourses, may make decisions reflecting the participation of service users, and contextual evaluations of risk based on understanding service user’s life histories. Understanding this combination helps explain the reasons behind variability, and evaluate the moral acceptability or otherwise of apparently variable decisions.