Abstract
Spontaneous freedom, the freedom of unplanned and unscripted activity en-joyed by “free spirits,” is central to everyday talk about “freedom.” Yet the freedom of spontaneity is absent from contemporary moral philosophers’ theories of free-dom. This article begins to remedy the philosophical neglect of spontaneous free-dom. I offer an account of the nature of spontaneous freedom and make a case for its value. I go on to show how an understanding of spontaneous freedom clarifies the free will debate by helping to make sense of the libertarian claim that compa-tibilist varieties of freedom do not allow for genuine novelty and creativity.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Gingerich, J. (2022). Spontaneous Freedom. Ethics, 133(1), 38–71. https://doi.org/10.1086/720778
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