Science Denial, Cognitive Command, and the Theory-Ladenness of Observation: A Postscript for a Time of ‘Post-Truth’

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Abstract

One worrying aspect of contemporary Western Society is the increasing prevalence of instances of ‘Science Denial’ in popular culture. Examples include both cases where well-attested scientific hypotheses are rejected and conversely, where scientifically discredited ideas are stubbornly retained. The paper raises the question whether the kind of argument for an anti-realist conception of empirical scientific theory considered in my contribution to the inaugural issue of this journal could in principle provide intellectual succour for these trends. The discussion proceeds through an examination of the role of ‘takings for granted’ in all reflective enquiry to the conclusion that a trusting acceptance of the general credibility of informants is a precondition for the exercise of individual epistemic responsibility, and that in that context an acceptance of at least the empirical adequacy, if not the truth, realistically understood, of the teachings of scientists in general is rationally non-optional.

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Wright, C. (2024). Science Denial, Cognitive Command, and the Theory-Ladenness of Observation: A Postscript for a Time of ‘Post-Truth.’ International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 32(1), 198–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2024.2302522

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