Guilt by Association: On Iffy Propositions and the Proper Treatment of Mental-Models Theory

Abstract

We show that by failing to distinguish between logical versus psychological predictions, Evans, Handley, and Over (see record 2003-02055-013) created strawman arguments that make mental-models theory (MMT; i.e., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) guilty by its association with assumptions that are known to be psychologically invalid. We also illustrate that MMT allows for different interpretations of 'if', including the conjunctive ('p and q') or probabilistic ('if p then possibly q' or 'possibly if p then q') interpretation allegedly beyond the capacity of MMT, and conclude that science is not advanced by a cursory reading of (as such oversimplified) theories that are consequently easy to refute. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved) (journal abstract)