Abstract
In this note we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials, as reported by Monderer and Shapley (Games Econ Behav 14:124-143, 1996), can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs, as reported by Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 6:57-61, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is also studied.
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CITATION STYLE
APA
Patrone, F., Pusillo, L., & Tijs, S. (2007). Multicriteria games and potentials. TOP, 15(1), 138–145. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-007-0008-1
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