Towards a cognitive neuroscience of intentional action and nonaction

Abstract

The question of how we can voluntarily con­trol our behaviour has an enduring fascina­tion for researchers from different disciplines such as philosophy and psychology. At the same time, this question is also related to is­sues of social relevance such as responsibili­ty and self-control. While research on willed action was long obsessed with the problem of free will, important research in this do­main has shifted away from this problem and rather investigates the functional and neural mechanisms underlying intentional action. Recent brain imaging research showed that intentional behaviour can be distinguished from externally guided behaviour on a func­tional neuroanatomical level. Furthermore, it was proposed that intentional action can be decomposed into different subcomponents. Here we provide an overview of the function­al neuroanatomy of intentional action. Fur­thermore, we discuss recent research of our group on intentional stopping and intention­al nonaction.