The case for considering consciousness second: Response to Baumeister et al.; Plassmann and Mormann; and Sweldens, Tuk, and Hütter

Abstract

Future efforts to better understand the causal antecedents of consumer behavior are aided by conceptual clarity, methodological rigor, collaboration, and debate. For these reasons we thank Baumeister, Clark, Kim, and Lau (this issue; henceforth BCKL), Plassmann and Mormann (this issue; henceforth PM), and Sweldens, Tuk, and Hütter (this issue; henceforth STH) for their insightful and indispensable comments on Williams and Poehlman (this issue; henceforth WP). In this rejoinder, we present an expanded case for our suggestion that we as a field consider consciousness second when building causal models of behavior. Because of the lack of scientific consensus regarding the biological underpinnings of consciousness, we maintain that treating consciousness as a cause hurts the field's ability to connect top-down construct-level understanding to principles derived from more bottom-up, mechanistic (physiological) aspects of consumer functioning. We offer that the path forward must be characterized by a much more inquisitive take on the impact of consciousness on consumer outcomes.