Stealthy Sensor Attack Detection and Real-Time Performance Recovery for Resilient CPS

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Abstract

Cyber-physical attacks exploit intrinsic natures of physical systems and can severely damage cyber-physical systems (CPSs) without being detected by the conventional anomaly detector. In this article, based on software-defined networking, we propose a holistic resilient CPS framework that can detect, isolate, and recover from cyber-physical attacks in real time. To show the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we focus on the pole-dynamics attack (PDA), a newly reported stealthy sensor attack that can make the physical system unstable. We develop an efficient detection algorithm for PDA and embed it into the proposed framework. By implementing a testbed, we validate that the proposed framework guarantees resilience of CPS against the PDA.

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Kim, S., Eun, Y., & Park, K. J. (2021). Stealthy Sensor Attack Detection and Real-Time Performance Recovery for Resilient CPS. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 17(11), 7412–7422. https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2021.3052182

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