Government Supervision on Explosive Enterprises' Immoral Behaviors in E-Commerce Enterprises: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Abstract

Explosive enterprises' immoral behaviors in the online shopping market are widespread and have not been effectively solved. Especially in developing countries, there is a direct relationship between massive immoral behaviors and the inefficiency of government supervision. Using an evolutionary game, this paper finds that immoral behavior is more likely to spread in online markets than in traditional markets. Only when government supervision and punishment are large enough and government's punishment for the illegal enterprise exceeds extra supervision costs that government pays, explosive immoral behaviors can be curbed. Additionally, consumer support is an essential factor in improving the efficiency of government supervision. This study sorts out the interactions between e-commerce market participants and the government, obtains a path to achieve efficient government regulation, and offers management insights. The findings can serve as a reference for ensuring order in the emerging online shopping market and can also provide theoretical references for future related research.