Situated Action: Reply to William Clancey

Abstract

Addresses issues raised by W. J. Clancey (see record 1993-40084-001) concerning the present authors' (see record 1993-40134-001) position on "situated action" (SA). Vera and Simon argue that Clancey embraces and reifies a holistic version of SA doctrine consisting of the whole environment, the brain depicted as a network of neurons, and the "agent" unified into a process called "human activity." They identify 3 flaws in Clancy's argument: (1) misconstruing the meaning of "symbol; "(2) a fundamental category error; and (3) a preoccupation with the immediacy of action, which deprives SA of any operationally defined and testable set of mechanisms. They maintain their position that there is no basic incompatibility between symbolic approaches that encompass some viewpoints of SA. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2003 APA )