ANALYSIS OF TRUST VIA THE INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN INTERMEDIARIES IN A DECENTRALISED SUPPLY CHAIN

Abstract

This article looks at the role of middleman relationships in a decentralized supply chain, considering a three-element structure consisting of an independent supplier, a distributor, and a producer. We study a model based on game theory that allows the analysis of the coordination of the three links, which evaluates qualitative criteria in their supply relationships, distribution, and reception of their operating preferences. The objective of the research is the construction of trust by analyzing the interrelationships of the three links for their consolidation, or not of the supply chain, using the Nash equilibrium, which allows summarizing satisfaction and loyalty throughout the supply chain. The set of Nash equilibria reflects that achieving satisfaction in the interrelationships between them is the main strategy to be followed by companies seeking to promote coordination within their operations. At the same time, we observe that only one agent is sufficient to maintain the flow of materials, i.e., the problem of the free-rider arises between us. In this study, five different equilibria are obtained, of which in four the supply flow continues within the chain, and in one equilibrium the relationship fails.