War, revolution, and the growth of the coercive state

Abstract

Modern states are powerful, resilient institutions, the most durable of which have established and consolidated their rule through conquest, revolution, and war. Successful involvement in violent conflict leads to the development of militarized and police states and reinforces elite political cultures that favor the use of coercion in future disputes. If warfare has unfavorable outcomes, elites will prefer noncoercive strategies in the future. From these and other propositions are derived models of the processes by which garrison states emerge and persist in autocracies and democracies. States with high material capabilities are more likely to become garrison states than weaker states, which tend to avoid international conflict and to rely on accommodation in internal conflicts. States with low political capabilities are susceptible to revolutionary overthrow and the establishment of revolutionary garrison states. The role of diversion of domestic conflicts to the external environment also is considered. One general conclusion is that only homogeneous democracies with low power capabilities and limited alliance obligations are unlikely to develop the institutions and political culture of militarized and police states. © 1988, SAGE PUBLICATIONS. All rights reserved.