The top-down nature of ontological inquiry: Against pluralism about top-down and bottom-up approaches

Abstract

Some philosophical pluralists argue that a top-down and a bottom-up approach serve as equally justified methods for engaging in ontological inquiry. In the top-down approach, we start with an analysis of theory and extrapolate from there to the world. In the bottom-up approach, we begin with an empirical investigation of the world and let our theory respond accordingly. The idea is that ontological conclusions arrived at via these two equally justified methods are then also equally justified. This paper argues that top-down/bottom-up methodological pluralism inadvertently grants primacy to the top-down approach. It goes on to suggest that this is, in fact, unavoidable because it applies to ontological inquiry in general. Ontological inquiry invariably prioritises the top-down approach because (a) ontological conclusions are not revealed during empirical investigations; instead, they are conceptual (that is, theoretical) posits asserted top-down and (b) even if we consider both top-down and bottom-up approaches during ontological inquiry, such a consideration itself occurs from within theory (that is, top-down).