The restrictions to the judicial review and the constitutional paradigm in Mexico: Back to the past?

Abstract

The restrictions that Mexican jurisprudence has recently defined on to the judicial review can be interpreted as a throwback to the consolidation of the constitutional paradigm. In particular, the jurisprudential criteria analyzed show that the imperative to found and motivate is weakened and the direct interpretation of the Constitution is despised. This return to the past is criticized in this paper. To achieve this, first, the jurisprudential evolution of the judicial review is explained. Afterwards, we reflect on the implications of this control in the constitutionalizing process; this shows the positive and negative impact that this control has on that process; furthermore, in this context, the idea according to which this type of control fosters a "chaotic interpretivism" and encourages "unbridled judicial activism" is rejected. Finally, the criticism to the weakening of the imperative to found and motivate is highlighted because this practice not only affects the exercise of judicial review, it also conditions the viability of the constitutional paradigm.