The relevance of dispositionalism for psychotherapy and psychotherapy research

Abstract

In this chapter, clinical psychologist Tobias Gustum Lindstad questions the scientific paradigm underlying the so-called Medical model of psychotherapy. Within such a model, Lindstad explains, psychotherapy research has lost its focus on critical dialogue and philosophical reflection, while psychotherapy has implemented treatment models supported by statistical evidence. Treatment interventions are tested with the same procedures as medicines, and thus the interventions are expected to work as ‘miracle drugs’, he argues. The Medical model commits the therapist to focus on implementing these specific interventions, which may effectively lead the focus away from the actual and unique needs of individual patients. In line with the philosophical framework presented in Part I, the chapter gives a philosophical diagnosis of this situation, by arguing that it is based on one specific and questionable view of causality: the Humean one. Lindstad argues here that an effective and constructive critique of the Medical model must start by revising its most basic assumptions about causality. The chapter shows how a switch to a dispositionalist view on causality is an indispensable step toward a psychological practice that is pluralist and relevant for the single person.