Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge

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Abstract

Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls 'equilibrism'. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge, and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is to find equilibria capable of withstanding examination. In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only.

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APA

Palmira, M. (2018, October 1). Philosophical equilibrism, rationality, and the commitment challenge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoy019

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