The Know-How of Virtue

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Abstract

It is widely accepted that virtuous behaviour ought to be motivated in the right way, done for the right reasons, and an appropriate response to the values manifested in a situation. In this article I describe how cases of individuals having poor understanding of the reasons for their behaviour, can nevertheless be conducive to the development of virtue. One way in which giving reasons for one's own behaviour can be inaccurate is when the reasons given are confabulatory. In confabulation, the reasons given for behaviour are post hoc, do not capture factors which actually brought the behaviour in question about, and are not well supported by evidence. Confabulations protect an individual's positive self-representations at the expense of more accurate appraisals of themselves and the circumstances. However, I argue that engaging in the construction of a positive self-narrative can be efficacious in making it a reality. Importantly, this is only possible when agents have the know-how of certain self-relational skills and attitudes, which are captured in a meta-virtue of self-regulation. When individuals can regulate their values and their behaviour effectively, such that they are in keeping, they can ultimately consistently embody virtues. Confabulation can be, and probably often is, part of this process.

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Murphy-Hollies, K. (2024). The Know-How of Virtue. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 41(3), 530–548. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12704

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