On the Method of Conceptual Analysis in Religion-and-Science

Abstract

In this paper, I critique conceptual analysis as used in the religion-and-science literature as a means of determining how to characterize the relationship between religion and science. “Conceptual analysis,” as discussed in this paper, begins by defining the terms “religion” and “science” and then derives their relation logically on the basis of those definitions. Scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds (not just philosophers!) employ this method. Although it is widely criticized, I argue that the method should not be abandoned, and the critiques can instead be read as providing ways of improving conceptual analysis. The paper starts by explaining the method and canvassing some exemplars. I then consider three general issues with the method—it employs monolithic conceptions, over-essentializes religion/science, and ignores whose conceptions are analyzed—and show how it ought to be reformed. I close with a discussion of what public audiences might find conceptual analysis especially useful.