Can Powerful Dictators Escape ‘The Market as Prison’? The Case of Pension Privatisation in Pinochet’s Chile

Abstract

The central role of economic elites in shaping public policy in Latin America has become increasingly clear. Yet most of the recent literature on the subject focuses on democratic contexts. This paper analyses pension privatisation in Chile as a case study for improving our understanding of business–state interaction in authoritarian contexts. Globally, the 1981 pension reform carried out during the Pinochet dictatorship became an example for pension privatisation elsewhere. Analysis of the policy-making process, based on novel empirical material, shows that from 1973 financial groups accumulated growing power which enabled them to first (a) defeat their opponents within the economic elite, (b) overpower their rivals within the state and, finally, (c) force Pinochet into passing pension privatisation legislation. Our results stress the need to include the study of different actors’ power resources – along with ideological issues and the regime structure – in attempts to understand the outcome of policy processes in authoritarian contexts.