So many controls; so little control: The case of Isaac Henderson, navy agent at New York, 1861-4

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Abstract

The experience of one man, Isaac Henderson, provides the lens through which this study examines the operation during the Civil War of the federal expenditure control system of the USA. This system's requisitioning, disbursing and auditing activities cannot be disentangled from the patronage system and profiteering that inevitably accompany war. Surging activity levels brought on by the war only aggravated the existing weaknesses. Rigidities, redundancies and formalities within the Treasury Department delayed disbursement processing and the subsequent auditing of those disbursements. Clerks who approved disbursements also audited the same disbursements. The focus on appropriation accounting - rather than on information for planning and control purposes - reflected the view that controls existed primarily to assure Congress and the public that money was spent in conformity with laws and regulations. Improper charges were sometimes intentionally placed against appropriations with available balances. Thus the most significant contribution of the federal expenditure control system may well have been to help legitimize wartime spending to Congress and the American people. © 2010 The Author(s).

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Mayer-Sommer, A. P. (2010). So many controls; so little control: The case of Isaac Henderson, navy agent at New York, 1861-4. Accounting History, 15(2), 173–198. https://doi.org/10.1177/1032373209359324

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