Generic security-amplifying methods of ordinary digital signatures

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Abstract

We describe two new paradigms on how to obtain ordinary signatures that are secure against existential forgery under adaptively chosen message attacks (fully-secure, in short), from any signatures satisfy only a weak security notion called existentially unforgeable against weak chosen message attacks (weakly-secure, in short). The new transformations from a weakly-secure signature scheme to fully-secure signature scheme are generic, simple, and provably secure in the standard model. Moreover, these two new paradigms are built only on weakly-secure signatures. They are different from the previous methods, which also relied on some other cryptographic protocols or non-standard models. By using two new paradigms, several efficient instantiations without random oracles are also presented, which are based on two previous weakly-secure signature schemes. These fully-secure signature schemes have many special interesting properties compared with the previous related signature schemes. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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APA

Li, J., Kim, K., Zhang, F., & Wong, D. S. (2008). Generic security-amplifying methods of ordinary digital signatures. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5037 LNCS, pp. 224–241). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68914-0_14

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