The Promise of NATO Defence Planning

Abstract

The NATO defence planning process (NDPP) is the cornerstone of Allied collective defence, and one of the few politically-guided military instruments translating common interests and agreed objectives into a concrete defence posture. The development of forces and capabilities to NATO's requirements has been the imperative for all Allies since 1949. But, despite the obvious and vital link between articles 3 (self defence) and 5 (collective defence) of the Washington Treaty, NATO members have always had problems with meeting budgetary thresholds and military planning goals. Thus, structurally, military planning has been constantly burdened with unfulfilled promises. To the defence of this recurring fact, one may add that, beyond the described pattern of the allies' behaviour, it is also a natural problem of national and collective defence planning. Long-term goals, mid, and short-term expected deliverables, confronted with a dynamic external and domestic strategic context, always produce a need to correct inputs (action) and outputs (results) and, thus, narrows the gap between expectations formulated in different situations and defence postures reflecting the current situation. In NATO, all of this has manifested itself since the first Lisbon 1952 force goals were adopted (by consensus), and later on, the famous benchmark of 3% GDP to be spent on defence was announced-to mention just two striking examples of this situation. Therefore, such patterns of behaviour by some NATO members (described in academic studies as free-riding) Dr hab. Robert Kupiecki-career diplomat, former Ambassador of Poland to the United States of America, and Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO. Currently, Deputy Minister of National Defence responsible for defence policy.