Abstract
In this paper I argue for the following six claims: 1) The problem is that some think metacognition and consciousness are dissociable. 2) The solution is not to revive associationist explanations; 3) …nor is the solution to identify metacognition with Carruthers' gatekeeping mechanism. 4) The solution is to define conscious metacognition; 5) …devise an empirical test for it in humans; and 6) …apply it to animals
Cite
CITATION STYLE
APA
Comstock, G. (2019). What do we need to know to know that animals are conscious of what they know? Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6(4), 289–308. https://doi.org/10.26451/abc.06.04.09.2019
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