Models, truth and realism: assessing Bas van Fraassen's views on scientific representation

Abstract

This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraas-sen's views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism (or at least homomorphism) between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misre-presentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called " semantic " or " model-theoretic " construal of theories does not give proper due to the role played by true proposi-tions in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force of van Fraassen's pragmatic -and antirealist - " dissolution " of the " loss of reality objection " loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phe-nomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them. (Campinas 23-28 august 2009) -in particu-lar professor Itala d'Ottaviano -who give me the opportunity to express my intellectual debt and my admiration to professor Newton da Costa through this paper. I also wish to thank Bao Van Lan, Patrick Assir Toty, Isa-belle Drouet, Leonardo Rolla, Olivier Sartenaer and Arne Vangheluwe who participated to my seminars on scientific representation held at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie during the academic year 2009-2010.