The moderating role of government heuristics in public preferences for redistribution

Abstract

A theory of rational attitude formation suggests public perceptions that income differences are too large should lead to demands for income redistribution. Public opinion scientists irregularly observe this at best. It is possible that the instruments we use to observe support for income redistribution are ineffective. We suggest at least part of the inconsistently observed linkages are due to unobserved confounding of government heuristics. We hypothesize that government affect provides a heuristic cue for survey respondents to answer questions on their preference for the government engaging in income redistribution. The greater the valence or quantity of reasons for a survey respondent to have negative government affect, the more perceptions of inequality and support for redistribution are decoupled and apparently inconsistent. To test this, we measured government affect at the country-time level using trust, corruption perceptions, and economic performance. We executed tests of moderation using slopes-as-outcomes regressions with ISSP data from 36 countries in 102 country-time points. Given the difficulty in fitting complex theories of society and politics into a limited number of macro-comparative cases, we ran a multiverse analysis of alternatively plausible models. There is a consistent negative moderation effect across models suggesting that our theory of government affect as opinion expression on a survey is worthy of further consideration. The findings also suggest more qualitative cognitive survey interviews to better understand this process.