Elite-centered regimes as barriers to meritocracy: the case of Indonesia

Abstract

The spirit of reform carried out with the noble goal of building a meritocratic system, eradicating corruption and nepotism, fighting domination over the elite and building dedication to the realization of good governance is not strong enough to eliminate the power of political dynasties and domination that have long been rooted in Indonesia. This research adopts a critical legal perspective, utilizing an interdisciplinary framework to analyze legal documents, Constitutional Court rulings, and comparative case studies. The findings of the study show that the political party system is still very thick with elitism and nepotism, which leads to political dynasties. Laws and regulations and Constitutional Court Decisions, which were originally expected to prevent conflicts of interest and curb authoritarian currents, have actually become servants of the interests of the elite. Several Constitutional Court Decisions such as age restrictions for Presidential and Vice President candidates as well as Regional Head candidates and the cancellation of the Presidential Treshold were actually made to expand the grip of the oligarchs. Coming from a unique perspective, this study makes it clear that Indonesia has a political system that’s half-and-half, where formal rules exist side by side with entrenched authoritarian practices. This leads to the elite being able to dictate the course of politics in the country and kill off any chance of a brand-new, more meritocratic system. The weak laws governing political parties and campaign donations in Indonesia make this problem even more severe. The researchers strongly recommend sweeping reforms to the legal and political systems in Indonesia. Ones that would require more realistic and enforceable regulations to combat conflicts of interest, full transparency in the funding of political parties and regular internal elections within these parties.