S&T Innovation Platform Sharing Service Contract Mechanism to Achieve Supply Chain Resilience

Abstract

While achieving fruitful patents in innovation, enterprises can face bottlenecks in industrial transformation. The fundamental cause of such difficulties is the lack of pilot equipment. To this end, the science and technology (S&T) innovation platform introduces equipment sharing to solve the problems in transforming enterprise patents. Based on the premise that service demand is endogenous to platform service effort and user relationship resilience, this paper introduces revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract mechanisms. It constructs a Stackelberg game model between S&T innovation platforms and enterprise users. Further, we explore the decision-making optimization involving platform service pricing, service effort, and a user’s relationship resilience. Our main findings are: (1) service pricing and relationship resilience show supermodularity to the platform revenue while showing submodularity to the user revenue. (2) The optimal user relationship resilience always indicates a decreasing trend in the pricing of platform services. (3) The platform and users have their preferences for contract types. When the platform dominates the game, they tend to adopt a revenue-sharing contract. When the users dominate, they are more willing to implement a cost-sharing contract. (4) As the S&T innovation platform strengthens the connection between the platform and users through the revenue- and cost-sharing contracts, it further enhances the supply chain collaboration among equipment suppliers, technology innovation platforms, and users, thereby achieving the purpose of improving supply chain sustainability and resilience. Technological innovation is an essential means to improve supply chain sustainability and resilience.