Status Signalling in the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Spinning, Military Posturing, and Vaccine Diplomacy

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Abstract

The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a critical geopolitical platform. Can major powers and regional states avoid conflict? This article explores the concept of status signalling to better understand the region. Status signalling aims to demonstrate a state’s preferred ranking in international society. By applying this concept to new empirical domains, the article shows how status signalling offers fresh insights into regional trends. As an example of strategic spinning, the emergence of the Indo-Pacific reshapes strategic thinking and diplomatic practice in the 21st century. While countries may engage in military posturing to signal their preferred status, the rising competition in the region is not always a zero-sum game. Countries can signal status by providing international public goods in non-military domains. The United States and China need to find ways to handle the potential problem of status dilemmas. Meanwhile, all countries should prudently manage competing expectations from multiple audiences.

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APA

Pu, X. (2025). Status Signalling in the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Spinning, Military Posturing, and Vaccine Diplomacy. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 27(1), 135–153. https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481241230862

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