The Signaling Mechanism of Fairness Concern in E-CLSC

Abstract

The E-CLSC (E-closed-loop supply chain) game model dominated by manufacturer is set, and information value about asymmetry fairness concern of E-platform (E-commerce platform) is calculated for manufacturer, recycler, and E-platform. By signaling model under various signal costs, the authors study the condition for E-platform to transmit real information about fairness concern so as to reduce profit loss for all parties in E-CLSC. The authors prove that E-platform has the motivation to disguise or exaggerate fairness concerns in order to obtain more profit, and manufacturers must try to identify the E-platform’s real fairness concern to avoid profit loss. Besides, only when different types of E-platforms need significantly different signaling cost, both of them would like to send real fairness-concern signal, and thus manufacturer can effectively identify E-platform’s real information about fairness concern so as to improve recycling rate and optimize the whole E-CLSC operation.