Institutional Complexity and Opportunity Structures: Weaker Actor Influence in International Intellectual Property Regulation

Abstract

Overlap among international institutions affects the strategic options that are available to actors. Yet no existing approach fully explains who benefits from regime complexity. While some point to materially powerful actors, others highlight weaker challengers of the status quo. Drawing on historical institutionalism, I conceptualize two dimensions of complexity. I argue that depending on the mode of interaction among the institutions in and the degree of institutional fragmentation of a governance area, opportunity structures for weaker challengers are more open or closed. Shifts on these dimensions over time thus lead to an opening or a closure of opportunity structures for challengers. I assess this argument by focusing on such shifts in two areas intellectual property regulation. The article contributes to the overall topic of the special issue and advances the literature on regime complexity by highlighting the divergent effects of different forms of institutional complexity on different classes of actors.