Theorising the politics of famine: Bangladesh in 1974

Abstract

1974 saw the first—and last—famine in independent Bangladesh. The disaster killed an estimated two per cent of the population and caused a crisis of legitimacy for the leadership of a nation that had won its independence only three years previously. Its catastrophic aftermath saw the emergence of an agreement among ruling elites and citizens that protection against mass starvation was a priority for the legitimation of political rule, or an ‘anti-famine contract’. This article examines the event to revisit theories of the politics of famine at a time when episodes of mass starvation are on the rise. Utilising existing theories of famine politics, it establishes propositions about the conditions under which states have or acquire the political commitment and capacity to prevent or mitigate episodes of famine. The effort at theory building draws specific attention to how to incorporate the geopolitics of famine and humanitarian relief into the analysis of the political reasons why famines occur or are not prevented.