Values and human rights: Implications of an emerging discourse on virtue ethics

Abstract

Virtue ethics, which draws much of its inspiration from the work of Aristotle, has since become the predominant moral theory and has focused attention on concepts that had long been neglected or insufficiently explained by the two other dominant ethical theories - deontology and utilitarianism. What renders virtue ethics unique is that it concerns itself primarily with moral selves, as opposed to moral laws. This emphasis on the development and refinement of the self has greatly expanded the horizons of contemporary moral philosophy and has contributed to a renewed search for both those universal values that best facilitate well-being, as well as those indices of character development that are recognized around the world and across traditions as indicative of moral maturity. Inasmuch as the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum has refocused the discourse in development on the cultivation of human capabilities as a way to advance human rights, here we explore how a capabilities approach might be enriched by the literature on virtue ethics.