DAVID HUME, LA IMPOSIBILIDAD DE UN PROGRESO EN LOS SENTIMIENTOS MORALES

  • Reinel Sánchez J
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Abstract

This essay brings up the extent of David Hume's moral proposal,specifically,the idea that facing the impossibility of accomplish sincere moral aims the individual is left to feign that such sentiments have been acquired. Such attitude is seen by the philosopher as favourable for proper social relations and for the shaping of coexistence agreements amongst possessive selfish individuals. Nevertheless,given such radical determinism of the mind conceived by Hume,the effort would remark only the attempts to team up with for reaching peaceful solutions for the problems of unsociability but would not have real effects over the original passions of the individuals. (English) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Reinel Sánchez, J. (2012). DAVID HUME, LA IMPOSIBILIDAD DE UN PROGRESO EN LOS SENTIMIENTOS MORALES. Revista de Filosofía, 68, 115–132. https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-43602012000100009

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