Sitting in silence or standing in protests: endogenous dynamics behind Vietnam foreign policy and the 2014 oil rig crisis

Abstract

China’s military rise and increased assertiveness in the South China Sea are thought to have incentivised smaller claimant states to balance against growing threats. Cited as a prime example of this development was the 2014 Sino-Vietnam oil rig crisis, in which Beijing’s provocation compelled Hanoi to adopt a tougher stance and reach out to other powers for leverage. From a broadly realist vantage, China’s provocation is seen as manifesting an exogenous shock to the balance of power, prompting Vietnam’s foreign policy adaptation. However, this view is lacking to the extent that it overrates how security incentives are self-evident without being shaped by domestic contestation. To redress these oversights, this article offers an agent-centred historical institutionalist account of the 2014 oil rig crisis, stressing the role of gradual endogenous developments in instigating foreign policy change. I argue that for Hanoi to endorse a strong position against Beijing during the 2014 oil rig crisis, the country’s foreign policy institution needed to go through a decade-long process of incremental transformation, advocated by the increasingly influential nationalist revisionist camp within the Party. Findings from this article demonstrate the need to engage with deeper socio-political contexts of small states to better understand developments in one of Asia’s most dangerous flashpoints.