Abstract
Predominant climate club research emphasizes state-centric clubs that alter the incentive structure and bargaining context for climate cooperation. This focus on national governments, however, leaves climate clubs vulnerable to political turbulence afflicting individual club members. Subnational governments are an important yet often overlooked type of actor in the club literature. This article contributes to understanding the role and nature of subnational government-led clubs in transnational climate governance and lawmaking through qualitative case studies of the Western Climate Initiative and the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. I identify the distinguishing characteristics that these clubs manifest in their membership and functions, as formalized through legal arrangements. I demonstrate that these clubs have the potential to increase structural stability, withstand political changes, and enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of climate action. They do so by functioning not only as organizations that create incentives for committing to legal norms and mechanisms for deterring free riding but also as communities of practice that generate shared understandings, resources, and norms to sustain club cooperation in pursuing a shared commitment to climate action. As such, each club applies a mix of rationalist approaches to benefit generation and constructivist approaches to community building.
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Chen, L. (2025). Subnational Climate Clubs: An Interactional Approach to Transnational Lawmaking. Transnational Environmental Law, 14(2), 312–341. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102525000019
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