Imposto de importação e evasão fiscal: Uma investigação do caso Brasileiro

Abstract

In this paper we measure the effect of tax rates on tax evasion using data on the trade flow between Brazil and the United States. Our results show that increases in the tax rates lead to higher evasion on two different ways: under invoicing and mislabeling higher taxed products as lower ones. These results corroborate the theoretical predictions of the Allingham (1972) model and contribute to the recent debate on the influence of tax rates on evasion. We also point out to the existence of nonlinearities in the relationship between tax rates and evasion by showing that higher rates raise the opportunity costs of paying taxes and thus encourage evasion. Finally, our results suggest that relatively high rates and a complex set of rules, especially for customs taxes, result in large potential rewards for taxpayers willing to bribe to cut their own tax burden and/or speed up customs clearance of their goods.