Der Gegenstandsbegriff als terminologische Hürde für Brentanos Konzeption intentionaler Inexistenz

Abstract

Brentano's use of the expression 'intentional inexistence' poses a considerable terminological problem. This is due not only to the expressions 'intentional' and 'inexistence' contained in it. The biggest hurdle is the liberal use of the expression 'object', which is encouraged by Brentano's notion of intentional inexistent (or immanent) objects. Carlo Ierna tries to meet this problem with a strategy that allows to hold on to the notion of intentional inexistence without accepting immanent objects. The originality of his interpretation lies, as I will show in my commentary, in the fact that it tries to achieve its goal by terminological measures alone. Following the same line, I will argue that Brentano's self-correction, made in the second edition of his Psychology, can also be interpreted in this context as a terminological move.