The Gaze of China’s Chief Officials: Do Cross-Level Political Positions Suppress Basic Public Service Performance?

Abstract

Prefecture-level cities play a crucial role in China’s economic development, with their party secretaries, as the chief officials, wielding significant resource-allocation and decision-making power. In recent years, the chief officials of prefecture-level city concurrently holding multiple political positions at different levels of government—“cross-level political positions”—has become increasingly common. Therefore, this study aimed to reveal how the cross-level political positions of chief officials (CLPPCO) affect urban public service delivery. Based on an analysis of panel data from 218 prefecture-level cities in China gathered from 2014 to 2022, this research employed a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) model to empirically examine the impact of this special arrangement on the provision of urban basic public services. The findings revealed that, compared to cities without CLPPCO, cross-level political appointments led to a significant decline in basic public service performance. Government investment served as an important mediating mechanism in this relationship. Furthermore, these effects varied across cities of different sizes, with medium-sized cities experiencing the most significant inhibitory effect, while the impact on large and small cities was relatively weaker. Heterogeneity analysis indicated that the fiscal self-sufficiency rate, local government debt ratio, and types of public service combinations all influenced the negative effect of CLPPCO on basic public services in medium-sized cities. This research not only provides new perspectives for understanding the relationship between incentives for chief officials and urban development but also offers empirical evidence for optimizing these incentives for urban chief officials while balancing economic development with the provision of public services.