Towards an ethics of conceptual engineering

Abstract

This paper is a prolegomenon to an ethics of conceptual engineering. Ethics is construed as primarily concerned with reasons for action, not belief, and it is argued that most such reasons are to be understood in terms of their connection with well-being. In the case of conceptual engineering, this is the well-being of the engineer and of others. There are alethic reasons for conceptual engineering, but they are derivative, as are many of the philosophical norms applying within conceptual engineering itself, such as parsimony and respect for the history of a concept. There are moral reasons for conceptual engineering, and practical wisdom will be a core virtue for conceptual engineers. Reaching agreement should be a key aim of conceptual engineers, and this is likely to be achieved most effectively by philosophers working together in research groups in close collaboration with other groups. The largely isolationist model dominant in contemporary philosophy itself needs engineering.