Asset specificity and state subsidies in industrialized countries

Abstract

Why do national government in industrialized countries subsidize many of their industries? Borrowing insights from literature on transaction cost economics and international trade, I build a model which tests the hypothesis that under threat of international competition disbursement of state subsidies varies systematically with the degree of asset (factor) specificity employed in a national economy. Asset specificity refers to the cost of moving factors (assets) from one activity to the next. I pool annual data on state subsidies in thirteen OECD countries during the period 1990-93 and regress them on two measures of asset specificity (physical and human capital) in the face of competition from abroad. Physical capital exercises a significant u-shaped effect on total and sectoral subsidies. Human capital has a week negative effect on horizontal subsidies. The results extend the literature on asset specificity and trade in two ways. First, they provide empirical support in favor of the argument that asset specificity and subsidy protection are related. While theoretical claims concerning asset specificity abound, the literature is generally short of empirical studies. Second, asset specificity helps determine the scope of subsidies.