Economic performance and survival in new democracies is there a honeymoon effect?

Abstract

In the literature on democratic survival, theories of democratic consolidation assume that new democracies are more vulnerable to breakdown. Theories of democratic honeymoons, however, claim that new democracies are less vulnerable to breakdown. This article addresses this seeming contradiction. Using an original data set that includes all democracies from the period 1951 to 1995, the authors use discrete-time duration analysis to determine if there is evidence for a period of enhanced survivability in new democracies. Using both continuous and discrete specifications of a honeymoon period, they test whether new democracies experience an absolute honeymoon (whether newness in itself makes them less prone to breakdown) or a relative honeymoon (where newness insulates them from the effect of poor economic performance). The results suggest that there is a short-lived absolute honeymoon, but that new democracies are actually more vulnerable to effects of poor economic performance prior to their third legislative election.