Power transmission scheduling for generators in a deregulated environment based on a game-theoretic approach

Abstract

In a deregulated environment of the power market, in order to lower their energy price and guarantee the stability of the power network, appropriate transmission lines have to be considered for electricity generators to sell their energy to the end users. This paper proposes a game-theoretic power transmission scheduling for multiple generators to lower their wheeling cost. Based on the embedded cost method, a wheeling cost model consisting of congestion cost, cost of losses and cost of transmission capacity is presented. By assuming each generator behaves in a selfish and rational way, the competition among the multiple generators is formulated as a non-cooperative game, where the players are the generators and the strategies are their daily schedules of power transmission. We will prove that there exists at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the formulated power transmission game. Moreover, a distributed algorithm will be provided to realize the optimization in terms of minimizing the wheeling cost. Finally, simulations were performed and discussed to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed non-cooperative game approach for the generators in a deregulated environment.