Influence of government credit risk on PPP projects in operation stage

Abstract

In PPP projects, insufficient risk management may lead to the breakdown of partnerships and even project failures. Among them, the government credit risk is regarded as unbearable risk and a key risk affecting PPP projects because of its high frequency and impact. Therefore, based on the contractual relationship between both sides, a principal-agent model for the optimal choice of investors and the government under the government default probability is constructed. This paper explored the quantity relationship of the government credit risk and the project utility through analysing the effect of government default probability perceived by both parties on the investor’s optimal effort level and government allocation ratio. The results demonstrate that the government credit risk will decrease the effort level of investors and have a negative impact on the utility of the project. Furthermore, the government’s modification of the contract allocation ratio based on its own credit rating can offset the negative impact of its credit risk on the effectiveness of the project. But this regulatory effect is limited. The findings effectively provide some insights and theoretical basis for solving the negative effects of government credit risk.